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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 




Control No.: 06-119-19 B 
Appearances: Christina Myers, Esq. 
Greene County Public Defender 
Greene County Office Building 
411 Main Street, 2nd Floor 
Catskill, New York 12414 
Decision appealed: June 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold o.f24 months. 
Board Member(s) Davis, Agostini 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received October 24, 20 19 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 










_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to _ __ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation· of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexe.d hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sepanite fjndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 03//J:;/~Od.D 61,;, 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant was sentenced to three to nine years upon his conviction of Manslaughter in the 
second degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the June 2019 determination of the 
Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision 
is arbitrary and capricious because the Board relied solely on the instant offense without citing any 
aggravating factors or properly weighing other factors such as that this his first arrest/incarceration 
and there was no criminal intent, his program completions, his receipt of an EEC, the case plan, 
and letters of support; (2) the Board failed to overcome the EEC presumption of release; (3) the 
Board unlawfully usurped the role of the sentencing judge and resentenced him; (4) the Board 
failed to comply with Executive Law § 259-c(4) by conducting a future-focused assessment 
analysis and its use of the COMPAS assessment was flawed because there was no basis to depart 
from the reentry substance abuse score; (5) the Board relied on incorrect information concerning 
official opposition because the D.A. letter was submitted in 2016; (6) the Board relied on erroneous 
information from an old case plan; and (7) Appellant requested and was denied the opportunity to 
review his parole folder before the interview.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
Generally, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted unless the Board determines that 
an inmate meets three standards: “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  The Board must 
consider factors relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Whereas here the 
inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law § 805.  An EEC does not automatically guarantee release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). 
 
While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
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The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Corley, 
33 A.D.3d at 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 818.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the 
Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
Parole Board release decisions made in accordance with the law will not be disturbed unless 
irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704  
(quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).  
There are no substantial evidence issues.  Matter of Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 
296 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2006); Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 
19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); cf. Matter of Horace v. Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 
1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant drove his vehicle in excess 
of 100 mph and struck two victims on the sidewalk, causing their deaths; his explanation for 
speeding and information presented ; that the instant offense 
represents his first term of NYS incarceration; his institutional record including program 
completions such as  ART, receipt of an EEC, and disciplinary infractions with a new 
drug use ticket since his last appearance; and release plans including an employment opportunity 
with a friend.  The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s case 
plan, the COMPAS instrument, an official D.A. statement in opposition to release, an official 
statement by defense counsel in support of release, Appellant’s submission and letters of 
support/assurance.  
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, Appellant’s misbehavior reports, and official 
opposition.  See, e.g., Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of Abascal v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 23 A.D.3d 740, 741, 802 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d 
Dept. 1995).  The Board noted the COMPAS instrument’s high prison misconduct score and 
departed from the “unlikely” score for reentry substance abuse based on Appellant’s drug use while 
incarcerated.  See Executive Law 259-c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).  The Board acted within its 
discretion in determining these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and 
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rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 
131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015). 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested 
with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period 
of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 
283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any 
manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 
1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Appellant’s additional contention that the Board failed to comply with section 259-c(4) of 
the Executive Law is likewise without merit.  Section 259-c(4) requires procedures incorporating 
risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  The Board 
satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 
116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. 
Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. 
Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed 
in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive 
and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, 
the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law did not eliminate the requirement that the Board 
conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the 
instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).   
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That is exactly what occurred here.  The Board considered Appellant’s COMPAS instrument 
– which is not uniformly low – but disagreed with the reentry substance abuse score as it is entitled 
to do.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d 
at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  Moreover, the Board’s explanation is supported by the record, which 
reflects Appellant has incurred multiple drug infractions while incarcerated including since his last 
appearance before the Board.   
 
The Board committed no error in its consideration of official D.A. opposition.   Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) requires the Board to consider recommendations of the sentencing court, 
the inmate’s attorney, and the “district attorney.”  As such, the Board was obligated to consider the 
official D.A. statement it received.  Appellant’s suggestion that recommendations expire is baseless. 
 
The Board also did not rely on erroneous information relating to the case plan.  The interview 
transcript reflects that the Board recognized and considered Appellant’s completion .  When 
asked why his case plan contained a goal to return to , Appellant indicated the goal was old 
and the Board accepted his response.  See Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 
N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017).  And while our review reveals Appellant had a later dated (April 
2019) case plan that was not made available to the Board at the time of the interview, it contained 
the same information as the (December 2018) case plan before the Board.  As such, any error was 
harmless.  See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 
691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Davis v. Lemons, 73 A.D.3d 
1354, 899 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dept. 2010). 
    
Finally, the record indicates Appellant was in fact given the opportunity to review 75 pages 
from his parole file prior to his appearance before the Board. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
